Symantec finds a grey-market relay that installs the real Codex and Claude Code CLIs, then turns off sandboxing and routes every request through its own servers
On Oct 29 Symantec's Threat Hunter Team disclosed an unauthorized AI relay seen at about a dozen organizations since early 2026, mostly in mainland China. Users install the genuine Codex or Claude Code CLI via npm, then run a one-line script from the reseller that rewrites ~/.codex/config.toml or ~/.claude/settings.json, points base_url at relay domains, swaps in relay-issued keys, sets the sandbox to danger-full-access and disables telemetry. Symantec says this is not a CLI vulnerability and it has seen no abuse so far.

Key Takeaways
- About a dozen affected organizations, mostly in mainland China, plus Chinese or home-market units of South Korean, Taiwanese and Malaysian firms in semiconductors, electronics, pharma, shipping and petrochemicals
- A one-line iwr | iex or curl | bash command fetches a fileless script from lookalike domains such as vibe.aiok[.]me, installs the genuine CLI, then rewrites its config, so it looks like a normal setup step
- The Codex sandbox is set to danger-full-access with network access on, and DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 and DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING=1 are set
- Relay-issued Claude Code keys use the sk-ant-oat01- prefix of subscription OAuth tokens, which Symantec says is consistent with, but not proof of, pooled subscription resale
- Symantec says this is not a vulnerability in Codex or Claude Code and it has no evidence the operator has abused its access; the risks are potential